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VIRTUE AND SALIENCE 
Richard Yetter Chappell and Helen Yetter-Chappell  
 
Forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
 
7KLV SDSHU H[SORUHV WZR ZD\V WKDW HYDOXDWLRQV RI DQ DJHQW¶V FKDUDFWHU DV
virtuous or vicious are properly influenced by what the agent finds salient or 
attention-grabbing. First, we argue that ignoring salient needs reveals a 
greater deficit of benevolent motivation in the agent, and hence renders them 
more blameworthy. We use this fact to help explain our ordinary intuition 
that failing to give to famine relief (for example) is in some sense less bad 
than failing to help a drowning child right before your H\HVLQDZD\WKDW¶V
FRPSDWLEOHZLWK WKH FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKHUH¶VQRSULQFLSOHG UHDVRQ WR VHH WKH
one life-saving act as any more or less choiceworthy than the other. Second, 
ZH DUJXH WKDW DOOHJHG µYLUWXHV RI LJQRUDQFH¶ PRGHVW\ EHOLHYLQJ EHWWHU RI
friendVWKDQWKHHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVHWFDUHEHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGDVµYLUWXHVRI
VDOLHQFH¶ 5DWKHU WKDQ SODFLQJ GHPDQGV RQ ZKDW ZH EHOLHYH WKHVH YLUWXHV
place demands on what we find salient. 
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1. Introduction 
 
7KLVSDSHUH[SORUHVWZRZD\VWKDWHYDOXDWLRQVRIDQDJHQW¶VFKDUDFWHUDVYLUWXRXVRU
vicious are properly influenced by what the agent finds salient or attention-grabbing. 
The moral quality of our character is influenced by our patterns of concern: a good 
person cares deeply about the right things, whereas a bad person does not. What we 
find salient reveals what we care about. Failing to find the right things salient may 
reflect poorly on us by directly indicating a lack of appropriate concern. Salience can 
also indirectly reveal our moral character, influencing the degree to which a 
negligent act or omission indicates a problematic lack of moral concern.  
What is salience? Salient things are attention-grabbing. A feature of the world 
is salient to an agent at a time t in so far as that feature exerts an involuntary draw on 
WKH DJHQW¶V DWWHQWLRQ at t. Just what this means is best illustrated with examples. 
Imagine a black and white picture of a fruit bowl. The entire picture is black, white, 
and shades of grey . . . except for a single bright yellow banana. For most of us, the 
banana will be highly salient: Your attention will be involuntarily drawn to the 
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banana, not because someone has instructed you to look at the banana or through any 
other deliberate effort on your part, but simply because the banana itself seems to 
µtug¶ at your awareness.1 
Models of salience have been developed by computational neuroscientists to 
explain how involuntary attention is directed to perceptual features [Koch and 
Ullman 1985; Itti and Koch 2000]. They argue that involuntary attention is directed 
by a µbottom-up, fast, primitive mechanism that biases the observer towards selecting 
stimuli based on their saliency¶ [Itti and Koch 2000: 1490]. The brain does this by 
creating a µsaliency map¶, combining low-level visual information such as changes in 
colour, intensity, orientation, and motion into a single global measure of 
conspicuity.2 Those parts of the map which µelicit a strong response are thought to 
draw visual attention to themselves and to WKHUHIRUH EH H[SHULHQFHG DV ³visually 
salient´, [whereas] directing attention at any of the other parts is thought to require 
YROXQWDU\³HIIRUW´¶ (ibid., emphasis added). 
While these neuroscientists are focused on forms of perceptual salience and 
attention, we take the basic concept to clearly extend to all forms of attention (which 
will likewise be guided by some neural underpinnings²or µsaliency maps¶²towards 
particular thoughts, objects, or features that the agent thereby experiences as 
salient).3 :HZLOORIWHQVSHDNRIVDOLHQFHLQWHUPVRIDQDJHQW¶Vdisposition to attend, 
by which we mean specifically this kind of active draw on involuntary attention. 
What is salient to an agent thus depends on the psychology of that agent. We 
could imagine an agent who is naturally inclined to find circular things salient, and 
who processes colour very differently from us, such that they find the black-and-
white oranges in the fruit bowl salient, rather than the bright yellow banana. As these 
examples suggest, salience is essentially agent-UHODWLYH 7KHUH¶V QR EDVLV IRU
attributing objective µsalience¶ to features of the world, independently of what 
individual ± and diverse ± psychologies happen to find salient.) But we can often 
                                                          
1
  Note that what is salient to someone at a given moment is what exerts an involuntary draw on their 
attention at that moment, not merely what typically draws their attention. 
2
  Similar models have been proposed for the low-level attention-biasing mechanisms at work in 
audition [Kayser, Petkov, Lippert, and Logothetis 2005] and in speech perception [Kalinli and 
Narayanan 2007]. Multi-modal saliency maps have also been proposed [Huber, Khosla, and Dow 
2009]. 
3
  We of course take no stand on the empirical question of whether the neural underpinnings of 
salience are uniform across all possible domains. 
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SUHGLFWZKDWW\SLFDOKXPDQDJHQWVZLOOILQGVDOLHQW6SHHFKLQRQH¶VRZQODQJXDJHLV
typically more salient than nonsense syllables or speech in an unknown language. 
2QH¶VRZQFKLOG FU\LQJ PLJKWEHPRUH VDOLHQW WKDQ WKHFULHVRI DQRWKHUFKLOd. The 
plight of a refugee might be more salient were you to meet them in person, or if your 
RZQIDPLO\ZDVRQFHLQDVLPLODUVLWXDWLRQRULIWKH\¶UHIOHHLQJIURPDFRXQWU\ZLWK
which you have personal ties. In each of these cases, the salient features µtug¶ at the 
DJHQW¶V DZDUHQHVV²though the natural draw of the salient may be overridden by a 
GHOLEHUDWHDFWRIZLOOWKDWIL[HVRQH¶VDWWHQWLRQHOVHZKHUH 
:H¶OO GLVFXVV D QXPEHU RI DGGLWLRQDO H[DPSOHV RI VDOLHQFH WKURXJKRXW WKH
paper, as well as some particular features that can plausibly bear on salience, 
including proximity and in-group/out-group status. 
This paper addresses two important relations between salience and character. 
The first half focuses on the indirect connections between salience and character. We 
argue for the following comparative claim: All else being equal, negligent inaction is 
OHVV EODPHZRUWK\ DQG OHVV LQGLFDWLYH RI D SUREOHPDWLF FDOORXVQHVV LQ RQH¶V
character) when the neglected moral considerations are less salient to the agent²in 
contrast to cases where the agent fails to act because they simply do not care. This 
can explain²among other things²the intuition that failing to give to famine relief 
(for example) is less bad than failing to help a drowning child right before your eyes, 
in DZD\WKDW¶VFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHFRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKHUH¶VQRSULQFLSOHGUHDVRQWRVHH
the one life-saving act as any more or less choiceworthy than the other. 
The second half of this paper explores the direct connections between 
salience and character. TheUHZHDUJXHWKDWDOOHJHGµYLUWXHVRILJQRUDQFH¶PRGHVW\
believing better of friends than the evidence supports, etc.) are better understood as 
µYLUWXHVRIVDOLHQFH¶5DWKHUWKDQSODFLQJGHPDQGVRQZKDWZHEHOLHYHWKHVHYLUWXHV
place demands on what we find salient.  
 
2. Salience and Quality of Will 
 
2.1 A Puzzle 
 
Singer [1972] invites us to imagine a child drowning in a pond, whom we could save 
at the cost of ruining our expensive clothes. It seems clear that we ought to save the 
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child, no matter the (comparatively insignificant) financial cost to ourselves. This 
motivates the principle that µif it is in our power to prevent something very bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, 
morally, to do it¶ [Singer 1972: 231]. However, as Singer notes, we are constantly 
violating this principle by failing to donate as much as we could to effective charities 
that address preventable harms caused by global poverty: malnutrition, disease, lack 
of basic medical care, etc. What should we think of this practical inconsistency?  
When we reflect on wKDW¶VDWVWDNH LW¶VQRW LPSODXVLEOH WRKROG WKDWZHUHDOO\
should prevent these grave harms rather than buying unnecessary luxuries for 
ourselves. (Call this claim Act Evaluation7KDWPXFKRI6LQJHU¶VDUJXPHQWVHHPV
plausible.4 But the analogy between the drowning child and the global poor may also 
be taken to suggest a much more troubling conclusion, via the following argument: 
  
1. It would be morally monstrous to do nothing and let the drowning child die.  
2. Saving a distant stranJHU¶V OLIH E\ GRQDWLQJ WR DQ HIIHFWLYH FKDULW\ LV
relevantly similar to saving a nearby drowning child.  
3. So, it would be morally monstrous to let a distant stranger die when we could 
have saved their life by donating to an effective charity. 
 
Here the conclusion is not just about the status of the act of helping²that it merits 
choosing, or ought to be done²but about the moral character of the agent who fails 
to act as they ought in this case. It is, according to this argument, no minor failure, 
but one that renders us morally monstrous or blameworthy to the highest degree. And 
this claim²call it Character Evaluation²VHHPV HQWLUHO\ LQFUHGLEOH ,W MXVW LVQ¶W
plausible that in failing to save distant strangers we reveal our moral character to be 
as bad as someone who callously watches a child drown and does nothing about it. 
  
2.2 The Solution 
 
Considerations of salience, together with a Quality of Will account of 
blameworthiness, can help to resolve this puzzle, showing how we can accept 
6LQJHU¶V$ct Evaluation without committing ourselves to the implausible Character 
                                                          
4
  :H ZRQ¶W EH GHIHQGLQJ WKLV FODLP KHUH EXW VHH HJ Unger [1996], Kagan [1991], and Cullity 
[2006]. 
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Evaluation. According to Quality of Will accounts, an agent is blameworthy to the 
extent that their actions manifest an insufficient degree of good will towards others 
[Strawson 1962; Arpaly 2003]. An agent may be understood as having a µsufficient 
degree of good will¶ ZKHQWKHLUGHVLUHVIRURWKHUV¶ZHOIDUHDUHVXIILFLHQWO\ZHLJKW\
both absolutely and in relation to their self-interested desires. The less that I care 
about others, and KHQFH WKH PRUH KDUPV WKDW ,¶P ZLOOLQJ WR LPSRVH RQ WKHP WKH
morally worse my character is. When I perform actions that manifest this lack of 
concern for others, I am blameworthy in proportion to the moral inadequacy of the 
desires that I thereby act upon. (Someone who acts with at least some minimal 
concern for others will be less blameworthy than someone who acts with complete 
GLVUHJDUGIRURWKHUV¶LQWHUHVWV 
But now notice the following fact about human psychology: Our actions are 
determined not only by the strengths of our standing desires (both self-interested and 
altruistic), but also by which desires are emotionally µactivated¶, or occurrently felt, 
and to what degree. Due to our limited cognitive capacities, we do not²and could 
not²constantly feel the force of everything that interests us or that we care about. 
Their full force is typically felt only when triggered, perhaps by certain thoughts or 
the proximity of relevant environmental stimuli. 
)RU H[DPSOH LW¶V QRWHZRUWK\ WKDW LQ WKH LQIDPRXV 0LOJUam experiments, 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRREHGLHQWO\HOHFWURFXWHDYLFWLPZDVVLJQLILFDQWO\UHGXFHG
when victims were made more salient via increased proximity. Milgram [1965] ran 
multiple experimental conditions, varying the µimmediacy of the victim¶ from cases 
where the subject could hear (but not see) the victim to cases where the subject had 
to manually place the hand of the protesting victim on the shock plate. µThe data 
revealed that obedience was significantly reduced as the victim was rendered more 
immediate to the subject.¶ [ibid.: 62] 0LOJUDP¶V RZQ H[SODQDWLRQV RI WKH GLVSDULW\
appeal to the importance of salience in motivation, noting that in closer-proximity 
cases the victim µQHFHVVDULO\LQWUXGHVRQWKHVXEMHFW¶VDZDUHQHVV¶ [ibid.: 63].  
This fact about the variable efficacy of desires indicates that not all failures to 
help others (even holding fixed the relevant costs and benefits) will necessarily 
reveal the same insufficiency of good will, and hence the same degree of 
blameworthiness. In cases where the needs of others are especially salient to an 
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agent, any altruistic desires in that agent can be expected to function at full efficacy. 
Hence the failure to help others when their needs are salient to the agent signals a 
much greater deficit of good will: one must be thoroughly lacking in concern for 
others to not be moved to help even when their needs are most salient. Such 
egregious deficits of good will yield, on the quality of will account, a greater degree 
of blameworthiness. 
This princiSOHPD\EHKHOSIXOO\DSSOLHGWRWKHFDVHRI6LQJHU¶VSRQG:HIHHO
that a person who could watch a child drown before his eyes must be terribly 
callous.5 7KH FKLOG¶V QHHG LV VR REYLRXV DQG VR HPRWLRQDOO\ JULSSLQJ IRU DQ\RQH
with a modicum of good will), that to fail to act in this case reveals a truly monstrous 
lack of concern for others.6 By contrast, good-willed people regularly fail to act in 
ways that would save the lives of distant strangers. The reduced salience of more 
distant needs is plausibly at least part of the explanation for this. A child drowning 
before our eyes shocks us out of complacency, activating whatever altruistic concern 
we may have, whereas the constant suffering of the global poor is easier to ignore, 
PHDQLQJWKDWLQDFWLRQGRHVQ¶W necessarily imply an egregious lack of concern. 
,Q 6LQJHU¶V SRQG FDVH VDOLHQFH FRUUHODWHV ZLWK SK\VLFDO SUR[LPLW\ 2WKHU
important factors that can affect salience include social proximity (a far-away 
IULHQG¶VPDULWDOWURXEOHVPLJKWZHOOEHPRUHVDOLHQWto you than those of a colleague 
down the hall) and in-group/out-group status. To borrow an example from Blum 
[1991: 706]: 
 
Tim, a white male, is waiting for a taxi at a train station. Waiting near him 
are a black woman and her daughter. A cab comes by, past the woman and 
her daughter, and stops in front of him. Tim, with relief, gets in the cab. 
 
The degree to which Tim strikes us as culpably complicit in this injustice can depend 
XSRQVDOLHQFHLQDFRXSOHRIQRWDEOHUHVSHFWV,IWKHWD[LGULYHU¶VUDFLDO discrimination 
                                                          
5
  As Slote [2007: 286] writes: µ,QWKHIDPLOLDUGURZQLQJH[DPSOHVVRPHRQH¶VGDQJHURUSOLJKWKDVD
salience, conspicuousness, vividness, and immediacy «WKDWHQJDJHVQRUPDOKXPDQHPSDWK\DQG
consequently arouses sympathy and concern) in a way that similar dangers we merely know about 
do not.¶ The role of salience in explaining our intuitions is also emphasized in Unger [1996]. 
6
  Likewise in the Milgram experiments, we think worse of participants who would shock victims 
even in the Touch-Proximity case, compared to those who would only comply in the Remote case. 
The former group seems to be particularly lacking in concern for the apparent victim, and we take 
this fact about their egregious lack of concern to reflect poorly on their moral character. 
 7 
is not salient to Tim, this surely signals a defect of character²a problematic lack of 
concern²on his part. But what we want to highlight here is a further comparative 
truth: It intuitively reflects much worse on Tim if he notices and just GRHVQ¶WFDUH, 
than if he fails to notice it altogether (at least if he is disposed to respond 
appropriately once the issue is drawn to his attention). 
Our analysis of the indirect significance of salience secures the common-
sense result that Character Evaluation is mistaken: Failure to help the distant needy is 
typically not as blameworthy (nor as indicative of bad character) as inaction in the 
FDVHRI6LQJHU¶VSRQGZRXOGEH0RUHRYHUWKLVUHVXOWLVVHFXUHGRQWKHEDVLVRIZKDW
intuitively, seems like the right explanation, namely that it would take a much worse 
person to let a child drown before their eyes, whereas any ordinary non-saint does 
less than they could (and even, arguably, should) for the distant poor.7 (Note that this 
conclusion about characteU LV FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK 6LQJHU¶V $FW (YDOXDWLRQ²that one 
should act to help the distant needy²and even the stronger claim that inaction in 
either case would be equally wrong.)8 
 
2.3 Salience vs. Attention 
 
In light of our earlier distinction between the two, you might wonder: is salience 
(being attention-grabbing) or actual DWWHQWLRQ ZKDW¶V GRLQJ WKH ZRUN LQ RXU DERYH
discussion? Mere attention seems insufficient: Aid fundraisers may momentarily 
                                                          
7
  In accounting for the falsity of the Character Evaluation, we have assumed that agents find the 
nearby drowning more salient than far away harms. Since this is true of normal human agents, it 
seems a fine assumption for explaining our intuitions (which are shaped by consideration of 
typical humans). But one might wonder about the implications of our view for agents who find 
radically different things salient&RQVLGHUDQDOLHQDJHQWZKRILQGVZKDW¶VULJKWEHIRUHWKHLUH\HV
and what they read of in magazines equally salient. Would they have to be more morally 
monstrous to ignore the drowning child than the distant needy? We think that once you fully 
appreciate ZKDWWKLVDJHQWILQGVVDOLHQWLW¶VFOHDUWKDWLJQRULQJHLWKHUQHHGGLVSOD\VHTXDOLOO-will. 
Likewise (in contrast to Kamm [1999: 182-3]), we think that an alien agent who found the needs 
of distant sufferers more salient than those nearby would seem to need to be more vicious to fail to 
help them than the nearby needy. (Note that we are not committed to the claim that failing to 
respond appropriately to salient things is the only respect in which salience influences 
blameworthiness. Beyond the ill-will of failing to respond to especially salient harms, it may be 
that failing to find certain things salient is itself a sign of ill-will, as illustrated by the case of Tim 
and the taxi. Perhaps, more generally, there are base levels of salience that are required for having 
minimal concern for others. The second half of this paper discusses some further respects in which 
salience can be normatively significant.) 
8
  Cf. Slote [2007: 290], who assumes that these salience considerations are incompatible with 
6LQJHU¶s Act Evaluation. 
 8 
bring to our attention the needs of the distant poor, but even so LW GRHVQ¶W VHHP
morally monstrous to shrug them off and return to our everyday lives²at least, not 
in the way that it would be monstrous to shrug off the needs of a child drowning right 
before our eyes. This makes sense, on our account, if such external promptings tend 
not to (fully) activate our standing desires in the way that genuinely attention-
grabbing stimuli do. Salience, not mere attention, thus plays an essential role in our 
account. 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
2XUDQDO\VLVVKRZVKRZIDFWVDERXWZKDW¶VSV\FKRORJLFDOO\ salient to an agent can 
indirectly alter our assessment of their moral character, thereby showing that we can 
DFFHSW 6LQJHU¶V $FW (YDOXDWLRQ ZLWKRXW FRPPLWWLQJ RXUVHOYHV WR WKH LPSODXVLEOH
Character Evaluation.9 ,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQZH¶OOJRRQWRH[SORUHKRZYLUWXHPLJKW
sometimes require us to find some things more salient than others. Then, in the final 
section, we will discuss the relation between these two ideas. 
 
3. Virtues of Salience 
 
Several philosophers [Driver 1989, 1999; Keller 2004; Stroud 2006] have recently 
defended the surprising thesis that some virtues essentially involve ignorance or 
epistemic bias. We will focus on two cases in particular: whether the virtue of 
modesty involves ignorance, and whether friendship demands that we believe better 
of our friends than the evidence warrants. In both cases, we will argue, these alleged 
µvirtues of ignorance¶ are better understood as µvirtues of salience¶²placing 
demands on what we find salient or attention-grabbing. While this frequently affects 
RXU LQLWLDO LQFOLQDWLRQV WR EHOLHYH LW QHHGQ¶W DIIHFW RXU VHWWOHG EHOLHIV :H HQG E\
considering what other putative virtues might appropriately be understood as virtues 
of salience. :H¶OOUHmain neutral throughout on the larger question of whether these 
                                                          
9
  ,W¶V ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW RXU H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKH GLVFRQQHFW EHWZHHQ $FW (YDOXDWLRQ DQG &KDUDFWHU
Evaluation could be used by consequentialists to support their position, in so far as it reveals that 
WKHFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWQHHGQ¶WVLPSOLVWLFDOO\UHDGFKDUDFWHUMXGJPHQWVRIIRIDJHQWV¶DFWLRQV 
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putative virtues truly are virtues.10)  
 
3.1 Modesty and Ignorance 
 
Driver [1989, 1999] argues that the virtue of modesty consists in a disposition to 
moderately underestimate RQH¶VRZQZRUWK7KLV H[SODLQV WKH µMoore-paradoxical¶ 
infelicity of the assertion:  
 
1. I am modest. 
 
2Q'ULYHU¶VDFFRXQW WKH LQIHOLFLW\RI LV WREHH[SODLQHG LQ WHUPVRI WKHJHQHUDO
LQIHOLFLW\RIFODLPLQJWKDWRQH¶VRZQEHOLHILVIDOVH,I\RXWKLQNLW¶VIDOVHWKHQKRZ
FDQ \RXEHOLHYH LW" /LNHZLVH ,I \RX WKLQN \RX¶UHXQGHUHVWLPDWLQJ \RXU VHOI-worth, 
WKHQLVQ¶WWKDWMXVWWRVD\WKDW\RXDFWXDOO\WKLQN\RXUVHOI-worth is rather higher than 
previously intimated?  
Driver notes that µbehavioural¶ accounts of modesty, either in terms of under-
stating RQH¶V WUXH ZRUWK RU D JHQHUDO UHOXFWDQFH WR EUDJ FDQ DOVR DFFRXQW IRU WKH
oddity of asserting (1). But they fail for the reason that they cannot distinguish 
sincere from false modesty. The difference, for Driver, is that the genuinely modest 
person does not merely behave as though she has less worth, she really believes it.  
We may wonder: If modesty really involves ignorance in this way, then how 
is it a virtue? Driver [1989: 383] initially suggested that it is because modesty-as-
ignorance typically arises from µDUHOXFWDQFHWRGZHOORQRQH¶VJRRGTXDOLWLHV¶ or give 
much thought to rankings, and it is this disposition, rather than the resulting 
ignorance as such, that is truly valuable (at least instrumentally, and perhaps 
intrinsically as well). But in that case, why not take this valuable disposition, rather 
than the contingently resulting ignorance, to be constitutive of the virtue of modesty? 
In later work, Driver [1999: 829] takes the more radical stance:  
 
In writing my original paper I had intended simply to argue against the thesis 
                                                          
10
  It is a separate project ± and not one that we undertake here ± to give systematic criteria for what a 
virtuous agent would find salient. Our aim is rather to account for our pretheoretic intuitions about 
these putative µvirtues of ignorance¶, and to assess which psychological feature (ignorance, 
attention, or salience) best explains them.  
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WKDWQRYLUWXHFDQLQYROYHLJQRUDQFHLQDQ\ZD\«+RZHYHU,ZRXOGOLNHWR
go further than this and claim that it is the ignorance that we value. 
 
To establish this stronger claim, she considers a case in which ranking dispositions 
and ignorance come apart. Suppose Albert the scientist puts a great deal of thought 
into his comparative standing as a physicist. He publicly declares himself to be (as he 
now believes) the fifth best physicist in the world, though in fact the evidence shows 
that he is third best. Driver bites the bullet and insists that, since he underestimates 
himself, Albert is modest²albeit in an µanomalous¶ fashion, µmodest in spite of his 
overzealous ranking behDYLRXU¶>LELG@ $OEHUW¶VGLVSRVLWLRQWRXQGHUHVWLPDWHKLVRZQ
worth is itself sufficient to establish this result. 
But as we see it, this case is under-described. Imagine several variations of 
the case. In the first, Albert is obsessed with his own achievements and abilities, 
which are hyper-salient to him. This hyper-salience is what drives him to 
compulsively rank himself against others. Nevertheless, he misjudges himself as 
merely the fifth best physicist in the world. In this case, it seems to us that Albert is 
not really modest at all, in any normatively significant sense. He is instead (mildly) 
epistemically irrational, in addition to being immodest. He is, in this way, doubly 
IODZHG,W¶VWKHVDOLHQFHRIKLVRZQDFKLHYHPHQWVWKDWLVGULYLQJKLPWRUDnk himself 
DQG WRSURFODLPKLV SHUFHLYHGVWDWXV WRRWKHUV$QGGHVSLWHDOOKLVHIIRUWVKH LVQ¶W
even able to accurately assess what it is.  
We might imagine other versions of this case, in which Albert is engaged in 
the ranking process for other reasons and plausibly is modest. Perhaps Albert is just 
REVHVVHG ZLWK UDQNLQJ WKLQJV +H UDQNV KLVWRULDQV SKLORVRSKHUV FRXQWULHV¶ *'3V
DQG VRRQ ,W¶V WKLVREVHVVLRQZLWK UDQNLQJ WKLQJV QRW DQ\SHUYHUVH VDOLHQFHRIKLV
own achievements, that drives him to rank physicists (and himself among them). Or 
SHUKDSVDZHDOWK\SKLODQWKURSLVWZLOOGRQDWHRQHPLOOLRQGROODUVWR$OEHUW¶VIDYRXULWH
FKDULW\LIKHJLYHVWKHPDUDQNLQJRIWKHZRUOGV¶SK\VLFLVWV2USHUKDSVLQDVWDWHRI
depression, Albert sets out to rank physicists to see just how terrible he is. In these 
cases, Albert may well be modest.  
What these cases bring out is that, contrary to Driver, underestimating his 
worth as a physicist is not sufficient for modesty. If his own physicist-virtues are 
abnormally salient to Albert, but for some other reason he misjudges his worth as a 
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physicist, this is not indicative of modesty.11 
Driver argues that what we value in modesty is ignorance itself (rather than 
an anti-ranking disposition), by considering a case where the two come apart in the 
opposite direction: Bob knows, on the basis of reliable testimony, that he is the best, 
WKRXJK KH KDVQ¶W KLPVHOI HQJDJHG LQ DQ\ UDQNLQJ H[HUFLVH WR FRQILUP WKLV 'ULYHU 
[1999: 829] objects that µ[a]ny professions of inferiority on his account would 
constitute false modesty¶, and hence be found objectionably patronizing and 
condescending by knowledgeable observers. Now, we agree that any such dishonest 
attempts to placate the presumed jealousy of his audience would constitute 
condescending rather than modest behaviour. But the mere possibility of behaving 
condescendingly cannot be sufficient to show that an agent is actually immodest. 
(Note that Driver believes Albert, above, to be modest. But he too could behave 
condescendingly, e.g., E\GLVKRQHVWO\UHDVVXULQJKLVFROOHDJXHVWKDWKH¶Vµnot even in 
the top ten¶.)  
6XSSRVH WKDW %RE QHYHU JLYHV D PRPHQW¶V WKRXJKW WR KLV UHODWLYH UDQNLQJ
What he finds salient are, rather, opportunities out there in the world. In so far as he 
assesses himself at all, he is disposed to do so in non-comparative terms, noticing 
where he has room for improvement [Brennan 2007]+HGRHVQ¶WWKLQNRIKLPVHOIDV
EHWWHUWKDQRWKHUSHRSOHIRUKHGRHVQ¶WWKLQNLQWHUPVRIFRPSDUDWLYHUDQNLQJVDWDOO
(In this way, he differs from the falsely modest person who merely pretends not to 
think of himself as better than others.) In this case, Bob strikes us as a 
paradigmatically modest person. This is so even though he could, if asked, retrieve 
from his dusty memory banks the information that the top-ranked person in the world 
happens to be . . . him. Whoa!  
On our account²call it modesty-as-VDOLHQFH LQFRQWUDVW WR'ULYHU¶VDFFRXQW
of modesty-as-ignorance²the virtue of modesty need not involve any epistemic 
error or impairment. It merely requires that the agent not be disposed to dwell 
overmuch on her own excellences or virtues. (See Bommarito [2013] for a similar 
                                                          
11
  Bommarito [2013: 106] makes a similar point, noting that what is relevant to immodesty is µwhy a 
person overestimates his or her good quality¶ 2Q %RPPDULWR¶V YLHZ WKLV UHTXLUHV DWWHQWLRQ WR
RQH¶VRZQSRVLWLYHIHDWXUHV DQGQRW MXVWDQ\DWWHQWLRQEXWDWWHQWLRQ µfor the right reasons¶, e.g., 
not µbecause an attention disorder prevents them from attending to anything for very long or 
because they are the kind of pessimists who never attend to any good qualities at all¶ [ibid.: 103]. 
)RU D GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ RXU YLHZ DQG %RPPDULWR¶V VHH IRRWQRWH 2 and 
section 3.3.3. 
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account of modesty as a virtue of attention.)12 She may know the truth of the matter, 
EXWLWLVQ¶WVRPHWKLQJVKHcares about.13 $QGVRLWLVQ¶WVRPHWKLQJVKHILQGVVDOLHQWRU
that tends to intrude into her thoughts.  
%RWK'ULYHU¶VDFFRXQWDQGRXUVDJUHHWKDWDPRGHVWDJHQWZLOOW\SLFDOO\QRWEH
aware of her ranking or comparative worth. But we diverge when it comes to 
explaining why this is so. Driver proposes that the modest agent must not believe the 
truth about her self-worth, she must instead underestimate it. We instead propose 
that, rather than giving the wrong answer, the modest agent simply is not disposed to 
attend to the question.  
We can further distinguish these two views by employing a µFate of the 
World¶ test, which shows that erroneous beliefs are not necessary for modesty. 
Suppose an evil demon will destroy the world unless Claire offers an accurate 
assHVVPHQWRIKHUDELOLWLHV:RXOG&ODLUH¶VDQVZHULQJFRUUHFWO\SURYHWKDWVKHODFNV
PRGHVW\" 2Q 'ULYHU¶V YLHZ LW ZRXOG ,I PRGHVW\ UHTXLUHV XQGHUHVWLPDWLRQ WKHQ
0RGHVW&ODLUH¶VEHVWHIIRUWDWDQVZHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQZLOO\LHOGDQLQFRUUHFWDQVZHU
But on our view, this need not be so. Modest Claire is not disposed to dwell on her 
accomplishments (does not find them salient), so the answer may not immediately 
spring to mind. She may even be initially inclined, just as a matter of first 
appearances, to underestimate herself, due to giving such little thought to her many 
achievements.14 But when the stakes are high, she is able to override her 
characteristic disposition to refrain from attending to her own importance. She can 
systematically comb through the evidence in an accurate and dispassionate light. So, 
                                                          
12
  7KH NH\ GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ RXU DFFRXQW DQG %RPPDULWR¶V LV WKDW VDOLHQFH FRQVLVWV LQ \RXU
disposition to find something attention-grabbing, rather than in whether you actually end up 
attending to it. So, for example, if an evil demon threatened to blow up the world unless Dale 
dwells on his own accomplishments each evening, his subsequent pattern of dwelling would bar 
KLP IURP TXDOLI\LQJ DV PRGHVW DFFRUGLQJ WR %RPPDULWR¶V PRGHVty-as-inattention view. This 
strikes us as too quick. We think that Dale may still be modest so long as his accomplishments are 
not salient to him, such that he has to work really hard to keep them at the forefront of his mind, 
and it feels to him awkward and unnatural to do so. 
13
  Schueler [1997] offers the related proposal that modesty consists in not caring whether others are 
impressed by you. But as Driver [1999] REMHFWVRQHPLJKWGLVGDLQRWKHUV¶RSLQLRQVRXWRIH[WUHPH
DUURJDQFHUDWKHU WKDQPRGHVW\WKRXJKFI6FKXHOHU¶V [1999] response). Our proposal avoids this 
worry, since the arrogant person is still interested in ranking, and finds his own status highly 
salient, LW¶VMXVWWKDWKHDVVXPHVWKDWRWKHUVDUHORZHU-ranked than he, and disregards their opinions 
on that basis. 
14
  The modest disposition not to dwell on her accomplishments makes it likely that she will not do 
so, and hence may underestimate herself. But note that neither the underestimation nor (as 
explained in footnote 12) the inattention that may cause it are essential to her modesty on our 
view. 
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upon considering the matter in depth, she is able to give the demon the correct 
answer. Then, the immediate need having been met, her attention will once again 
drift away from herself, and back to what she considers to be intrinsically more 
important matters.  
This account of modesty-as-VDOLHQFHKDVWZRPDMRUDGYDQWDJHVRYHU'ULYHU¶V
modesty-as-ignorance view. First, it yields verdicts that are intuitively more plausible 
in the cases of Albert, Bob, and Claire, discussed above. Second, it seems more 
appealing on theoretical grounds, in so far as we believe that our account can offer a 
better explanation of why modesty is a virtue. 
On our account, the modest agent is one who is not disposed to find their own 
positive attributes especially salient. These dispositions would naturally result from 
WKHDJHQW¶VKDYLQJLQWHUQDOL]HGFHUWDLQLPSRUWDQWSXWDWLYH)15 moral truths²that their 
RZQDFKLHYHPHQWVDUHQ¶WDOOWKDWLPSRUWDQWLQWKHJUDQGVFKHPHRIWKLQJVWKDWHDFK
of us is but one person amongst moral equals, and that comparative rankings lack 
intrinsic importance.16 In so IDU DV WKH GLVSRVLWLRQ QRW WR ILQG RQH¶V RZQ SRVLWLYH
attributes salient stems from such an appreciation of moral truths, it has a kind of 
intrinsic appropriateness that befits its status as a genuine virtue.17  
%\FRQWUDVW'ULYHU¶VDFFRXQWRIPRGHVW\EHVWRZVLWZLWKPHUHO\LQVWUXPHQWDO
value: µwhat makes modesty as ignorance valuable[?] My claim is that a person who 
is modest stops problems from arising in social situations¶ [Driver 1999: 828]. In 
                                                          
15
  Helen is not persuaded that the first two claims are moral truths or that modesty is a virtue. But 
perhaps you are. 
16
  One might wonder whether the non-VDOLHQFH RI RQH¶V RZQ SRVLWLYH WUDLWV LV SOD\LQJ DQ\ UROH LQ
PRGHVW\¶V EHLQJ D YLUWXH 3HUKDSV LW LV VLPSO\ KDYLQJ LQWHUQDOL]HG WKHVH PRUDO WUXWKV WKDW LV
virtuous, and not the salience dispositions that stem from this internalization. But arguably the 
salience dispositions are a constitutive part of truly internalizing the egalitarian perspective. We 
may imagine someone who says, µ<HV,¶PQRWPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQDQ\RQHHOVHIURPD*RG¶VH\H
perspective. BuWWKDW¶VQRWWKHSHUVSHFWLYH,¶P WDNLQJ,¶PDWWHQGLQJWRPHDQGP\DZHVRPHQHVV¶ 
%XWWKHUH¶VDFOHDUVHQVHLQZKLFKWKLVSHUVRQKDVQ¶Wtruly internalized the egalitarian perspective ± 
their moral belief is too compartmentalized from their personal perspective. Perhaps there is a 
weaker sense in which they have µinternalized¶ the moral claim in virtue of readily believing it, but 
then this very case makes clear that mere µinternalization¶ without the right salience dispositions is 
not sufficient for modesty. 
17
  %XWWKHUHPLJKWEHRWKHUµDQRPDORXV¶H[SODQDWLRQVIRUVXFKVDOLHQFH-related dispositions. Perhaps 
I took a pill that renders me unable to attend to any of my own positive attributes. Our account of 
the value of modesty wRXOGQRWDSSO\ WR VXFKDFDVH:H¶UH WHPSWHG WRFRQFOXGH WKDWPRGHVW\
though typically a virtue, is thus capable of being instantiated in a defective form. But if one thinks 
that modesty is essentially a virtue, one could simply embrace a more restrictive notion of modesty 
on which the salience dispositions must flow from the appreciation of moral truths to truly count 
as modesty at all. We think this is merely a terminological point, and are happy to accept that there 
are broader and more restrictive uses of the term. 
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particular, modesty-as-ignorance may be instrumentally useful in defusing 
problematic social emotions like jealousy that can arise when faced with superior 
others. These negative social emotions arise precisely from an exaggerated concern 
IRU RQH¶V VWDWXV 2XU YLHZ RI PRGHVW\ DYRLGV WKHVH LVVXHV IURP WKH VWDUW DV WKH
PRGHVWDJHQWLZRQ¶WKDYHVXFKFRQFHUQVDQGKHQFHLLZRQ¶W LQIODWHWKHPVHOYHV
or emphasize their status in a way that is threatening to others. In sum, modesty-as-
ignorance results in people putting forward a less threatening presentation of their 
status, while modesty-as-salience results in people not putting forward status 
presentations at all. Thus, our view of modesty captures the same instrumental value 
DV'ULYHU¶VLQDGGLWLRQWRRSHQLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIPRGHVW\¶VKDYLQJLQWULQVLFYDOXH 
  
3.2 Friendship and Epistemic Partiality 
 
Keller [2004: 329] uses the following incident from the sitcom Friends to suggest 
that friendship requires epistemic partiality, or thinking better of our friends than the 
evidence warrants:  
Joey and Chandler are playing a game where the latter gives immediate, 
unreflective and unfiltered answers to the questions asked by the former. Joey has 
just landed an acting job in Las Vegas, which he hopes will be his big break. He asks 
&KDQGOHU µ,V WKLV MRE JRLQJ WR EH P\ ELJ EUHDN"¶ WR ZKLFK &KDQGOHU UHIOH[LYHO\
DQVZHUV µ1R¶ SXWWLQJ WKHLU IULHQGVKLS LQ FULVLV &KDQGOHU¶V ODFN RI EHOLHI LQ KLP
causes Joey to feel betrayed, and Chandler to feel guilty, suggesting that their 
friendship involves normative expectations to think well of each other²even in the 
absence of evidence warranting such optimism.  
Stroud [2006: 508] similarly argues: 
 
[T]he bias of the good friend will normally take the form of casting what she 
sees or hears in a different light, shading it differently, placing it in a 
different optic, embedding it in a different overall portrait of her friend. 
Where our friends are concerned, in short, we become spin doctors. 
 
Both Keller and Stroud conclude that friendship places demands on our beliefs. As in 
the previous section, we want to resist this strong conclusion, and replace it instead 
with a more subtle demand on what we find salient. We agree with 6WURXG¶V
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characterization of how friendship requires us to see things in a more positive light. 
7KH JRRG IULHQG ZLOO EH GLVSRVHG WR DWWHQG WR WKHLU IULHQGV¶ YLUWXHV WDOHQWV DQG
successes. Even in light of damning evidence against a friend, the good friend will 
continue to find her positive attributes disproportionately salient. This bias in 
salience may²particularly on initial assessment²lead friends to form beliefs about 
friends that are more rosy than the evidence merits. But, as with modesty, we see 
such false beliefs as a contingent consequence of good friendship, not as a 
requirement of friendship in its own right.  
Again, we can distinguish the alternative views on offer by means of a µFate 
of the World¶ test: Suppose that an evil demon will destroy the world unless 
&KDQGOHUDQVZHUVFRUUHFWO\ZKHWKHU-RH\¶VQHZMREZLOOEHKLVELJEUHDN$QGOHW¶V
DOWHU WKHGHWDLOVRI WKHFDVH WRVSHFLI\ WKDW&KDQGOHU ILQGV-RH\¶VSRVLWLYHDWWULEXWHV
PRUHVDOLHQWWKDQKLVZHDNQHVVHV7KHGLPHQVLRQVDORQJZKLFKKH¶VD good actor are 
ZKDW UHDOO\ VWDQG RXW WR &KDQGOHU WKRVH DORQJ ZKLFK KH¶V ZHDNHU IDGH LQWR WKH
EDFNJURXQG-RH\¶VSDVWVXFFHVVHVDUHPRUHVDOLHQWWKDQKLVSDVWIDLOXUHV7KLVELDVLQ
VDOLHQFH WRJHWKHU ZLWK &KDQGOHU¶V GHHS KRSHV IRU -RH\¶V VXFFHVV DQG WKH Qatural 
KXPDQ LQFOLQDWLRQ WRZDUGV ZLVKIXO WKLQNLQJ FDXVH &KDQGOHU¶V XQUHIOHFWLYH
impression to be an optimistic one: µ<HDK-RH\¶VJRWDVKRW¶ But then, as the stakes 
are so high, he pauses and reflects more carefully on the question. He tries to 
systematically review the evidence, deliberately attending to things that friendship 
might have made less salient. He forces himself to explicitly attend to the low base 
UDWHRIVXFFHVVLQWKHDFWLQJEXVLQHVV$QGUHFRJQL]LQJWKDWDVDIULHQGKH¶VQDWXUDOO\
going WREHDELWELDVHGLQ-RH\¶VIDYRXUKHH[SOLFLWO\DGMXVWVKLVFUHGHQFHGRZQWR
correct for this. Weighing it all up carefully, Chandler concludes (against his initial 
LQFOLQDWLRQWKDWWKHDQVZHULVLQIDFWµ1R¶ 
 When his process of belief-formation is spelled out in this way, does Chandler 
still seem like he has been in any way a bad friend? Surely not. The crucial 
difference between the original case and this one is that while Chandler still comes to 
DQHJDWLYHFRQFOXVLRQDERXW-RH\¶VFDUHHUSURVSHFWV, in our case his initial inclination 
was more positive. And this seems all that friendship, intuitively, demands. A good 
IULHQG ILQGV KLV IULHQG¶V VWUHQJWKV WR EH PRUH salient than his weaknesses, which 
naturally leads to an initial inclination towards overestimation. But there is no 
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requirement that we settle for first appearances. We can (if pressed) correct for our 
biases, and so reach a more accurate final conclusion, without in any way violating 
the norms of friendship. The problem with Chandler in the original case is not that he 
believed SRRUO\ RI -RH\ EXW WKDW LW GLGQ¶W HYHQ appear to him that Joey would do 
well. 
 
3.3 Other Virtues of Salience 
 
Driver suggests that there may be a great many virtues that (like modesty on her 
view) are best thought oI DV YLUWXHV RI LJQRUDQFH :H VXVSHFW WKDW VKH¶V ULJKW WKDW
there are many virtues that fall into the same class as modesty and should receive 
similar treatment, but as with modesty we will argue that these are best thought of as 
virtues of salience.18 
 
3.3.1 Blind Charity 
 
A Blindly Charitable person is²as Driver [1989: 381] defines it²a person who 
µsees the good in [others], but does not see the bad¶. The blindly charitable person 
QRWRQO\UHIUDLQVIURPVSHDNLQJLOORIRWKHUVKHGRHVQ¶Wthink ill of others, even when 
the evidence would warrant it. In this way, Driver argues that blind charity is µan 
ignorance abRXWZKDWLVEDGLQRWKHUSHRSOH¶ [ibid.: 382]. 
We think that such a tendency to see only the good and not the bad in people 
is also better understood as a virtue of salience. One does not have to²on 
reflection²believe that there is no evil in the world, that their neighbours never 
think unkind thoughts, and so on, to possess this virtue. One could exemplify the 
virtue of seeing the good, not the bad, and yet recognize on an intellectual level that 
RWKHUVVRPHWLPHVDFWRXWRIVSLWHJRVVLSDQGGRQ¶WKDYHWKHLUIULHQGV¶EDFNV 
                                                          
18
  2QH PLJKW EH LQFOLQHG WR WKLQN WKDW ERWK 'ULYHU¶V DFFRXQW DQG RXU RZQ SLFN RXW VRPHWKLQJ RI
value. One could adopt a hybrid view on which there are two valuable aspects of modesty: 
ignorance and salience. While nothing we have said strictl\UXOHVWKLVRXWZH¶UHGLVLQFOLQHGWR this 
proposal for two reasons. (1) The salience account of these virtues is able to fully account for the 
LQWXLWLYH GDWD SRLQWV WKDW PRWLYDWHG 'ULYHU¶V YLHZ WKXV XQGHUFXWWLQJ WKH QHHG WR SRVLW YDOXH LQ
ignorance. (2) ,Q IXUWKHU FDVHV ZKLFK GLIIHUHQWLDWH WKH WZR DFFRXQWV HJ YDULRXV µ)DWH RI WKH
:RUOG¶FDVHV WKHLJQRUDQFHDFFRXQWVVHHPWRSRVLWLYHO\\LHOGWKH wrong results. A hybrid view 
would inherit this flaw. 
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:KDW¶V UHOHYDQW LV WKDW \RX ILQG WKH JRRG LQ WKRVH DURXQG \RX PXFK PRUH
salient than the bad. Consider Ed: Ed finds it hard to attend to the flaws not only of 
his friends but of all his fellow humans. When someone takes a parking space that he 
ZDVFOHDUO\ZDLWLQJDQG LQGLFDWLQJIRUKHGRHVQ¶WGZHOORQWKHVPDOOKDUPWKH\¶YH
GRQHKLP:KDW¶VVDOLHQWLQKLVPLQGLVWKHH[KDXVWHGand frantic look of the driver 
as she herds her three children across the parking lot, and how she seems patient with 
KHUFKLOGUHQHYHQZKHQVKH¶VVRREYLRXVO\KDYLQJDGLIILFXOWGD\7KLVLVW\SLFDORI
Ed. He always finds the positive traits of others more salient than their negative 
traits. He views his fellow human beings through rose-tinted lenses. 
Ed seems like a paradigm case of the blindly charitable. This seems so even 
if²were the fate of the world to depend on it²he could systematically comb 
through the evidence about the characters of his fellow humans, deliberately 
compensating for his attentional biases, and come to an accurate assessment of the 
FKDUDFWHUVRIRWKHUV$VLQWKHFDVHRIIULHQGVKLSLWVHHPVWKDWZKDW¶VYDOXDEOHLVQRW
(G¶VLJnorance, but his initial inclination to believe the best of others²the fact that 
he finds the good in others to be more salient than the bad in them.19 
In this way, being blindly charitable is much like being a good friend. But 
where friendship arguably requires us to find RXU IULHQGV¶ positive traits 
comparatively salient, the blindly charitable extend this charitable outlook to all 
those they encounter. 
 
3.3.2 Forgiving and Forgetting 
 
Another virtue that Driver [1989] describes as a virtue of ignorance is the willingness 
to µforgive and forget¶ rather than holding a grudge for past harms. This too is better 
captured as a virtue of salience. 
Your life-long friend reveals some personal information that you confided in 
her, ultimately resulting in your losing your job. Because of the value you place on 
your friendship, you decide to µforgive and forget¶. This does not require you to wipe 
all traces of the past harm from your memory, or to become ignorant of the past 
                                                          
19
  In fact, while Driver [1989: 382] ultimately describes blind charity as a virtue of ignorance, that 
µrequires that one be unknowing about something¶, she initially describes blind charity as µa 
disposition not to see the defects, and to focus on the virtues of persons¶ (Driver [1989: 381], 
emphasis added). 
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wrong.  
Further, µforgiving and forgetting¶ GRHVQ¶WVHHPWR UHTXLUH WKDW\RXactually 
fail to attend to the past harm. Imagine that something occurs that forces you to 
attend to the past harm (despite not finding it particularly attention-grabbing). 
Perhaps the police have come by asking about the event. The fact that you are, as the 
police question you, attending to the event, does not mean that you are holding a 
grudge. Even were you required to continually attend to the event in a drawn out 
trial, this would not entail that you held a grudge.  
So µforgiving and forgetting¶ is a virtue of salience (rather than of ignorance 
or attention). This fits naturally with the intuitive idea that if you have truly 
internalized your forgiveness, the harms done to you in the past will no longer tug at 
your heartstrings. The memories are silent, even if external circumstances can cause 
you to attend to them.  
 
3.3.3 Gratitude 
 
We conclude with a virtue that may not be so well captured as a virtue of salience, 
but which clarifies what it is to be a virtue of salience, as opposed to a virtue of 
attention [Bommarito 2013]. 
To feel gratitude seems to require that we actually attend to the value of 
something someone else has done for us. Someone who found the value of what 
someone had done for them attention-grabbing (salient), but who through some fluke 
never actually attends to this, does not feel grateful, though they may be disposed to 
feel gratitude. 
,W¶V DQ LQWHUHVWing question just what the relationship is between feeling 
gratitude and being a grateful person (i.e., possessing the virtue of gratitude).20 If 
gratitude is a virtue of attention, then you could become a grateful person by setting 
alarm reminders throughout the day to attend to good things others have done for 
\RX 3HUKDSV \RX WKLQN WKDW \RXGRQ¶W VSHQGVXIILFLHQW WLPHDWWHQGLQJ WR WKHJRRG
things others do for you, and decide to remedy this by setting your alarm to ensure 
you give these goods the attention they deserve.) But the mere frequency of grateful 
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 :H¶UHJUDWHIXOWR(GHQ/LQIRUSURPSWLQJXVWRFRQVLGHUWKLVPRUHFDUHIXOO\ 
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feelings might seem insufficient for making you a grateful person if they require 
such deliberate efforts. On the other hand, if gratitude is a virtue of salience, then one 
could be a grateful person despite never actually feeling gratitude (due to a series of 
flukes that continually draw your actual attention away from what others have done 
for you). This might seem surprising.  
This might lead some to prefer a hybrid account: Perhaps the truly grateful 
person must both ILQGRWKHUV¶DVVLVWDQFHWREHVDOLHQWand actually end up attending to 
it (for this reason). :HGRQ¶WKDYHDILUPYLHZRQWKLV But whatever the right account 
of gratitude turns out to be, we think the range of options clearly brings out the 
difference between virtues of mere attention and virtues of salience proper. 
 
4. Wrapping up 
 
This paper has explored the two-way relation between salience and good character. 
)LUVW ZH VDZ WKDW RXU HYDOXDWLRQ RI DQ DJHQW¶V PRUDO FKDUDFWHU QHHGV WR WDNe into 
account what they find salient, since neglecting a salient need reflects a greater 
deficit of benevolent motivation than does neglecting an objectively similar but much 
less noticeable need. In this way, facts about salience can serve as an important 
µinput¶ to our moral assessments. In the second half of the paper, we saw that the 
connection also goes the other way: Finding some things more salient than others can 
be an important µoutput¶, requirement, or downstream consequence of good 
character. In particular, we argued that the virtue of modesty consists in not finding 
RQH¶V RZQ DFKLHYHPHQWV H[FHVVLYHO\ VDOLHQW DQG WKDW D JRRG IULHQG ZLOO ILQG KLV
IULHQGV¶ EHWWHU TXDOLWLHV WR EH PRUH VDOLHQW WKDQ DQ LPSDUWLDO VWUDQJHU ZRXOG ILQG
them. Our proposals differ from previously floated views, in both cases, because we 
LQVLVW WKDW WKHUH¶VQRIXUWKHUUHTXLUHPHQWIRU WKHDJHQW WRbelieve in line with initial 
appearances²he may instead correct for any biases introduced by what he finds 
more or less salient.  
But given that virtue can place constraints on what we find salient, this might 
lead one to wonder whether being virtuous might also require that, e.g., we find 
distant harms as salient as nearby ones, find harms to out-groups as salient as harms 
to in-groups, and so on. Perhaps in the Singer case, the truly virtuous person would 
 20 
find those starving on the other side of the world just as salient as the child drowning 
EHIRUH WKHLU H\HV 3HUKDSV LW UHIOHFWV SRRUO\ RQ XV WKDW ZH GRQ¶W ILQG WKHVH WKLQJV
equally salient. 
Perhaps.21 But this is fully compatible with our contention that²given that 
we have the salience dispositions that we do²ignoring the drowning child displays a 
greater deficit of goodwill (and is more blameworthy) than ignoring distant needs. 
Our aim in the first part of the paper was to establish the comparative claim: 
neglecting actually salient needs is generally more blameworthy than neglecting 
(actually) non-salient ones. This is compatible with thinking that an ideally virtuous 
agent would differ from us in what they find salient.22 ,W¶VVLPSO\WRDGGWKDWMXVWDV
what we find salient can reflect well or poorly on us, so it can affect how our 
(in)actions reflect on our moral character.23 
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